



The Court’s Opinion in Avis 1/19 regarding the
Istanbul Convention
Citation for published version (APA):
Chamon, M. (2021). The Court’s Opinion in Avis 1/19 regarding the Istanbul Convention. EU Law Live , 1-
8.
Document status and date:
Published: 12/10/2021
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.




Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
























Suggested citation: Merijn Chamon, “The Court’s Opinion in Avis 1/19 regarding the Istanbul Convention”, EU Law 




















On 6 October 2021 the Court of Justice (EU) 
ruled that for the conclusion of the Istanbul 
Convention, the EU is not required to wait for the 
completion of the ratification by the Member 
States but neither is the EU required to go ahead 
and complete its own ratification of the 
Convention before the Member States have done 
so. While this may be the main take home 
message from the Opinion, the Court also dealt 
with finer points of the law governing the EU’s 
external relations and the procedure before the 
Court. 
This Op-Ed will build on earlier publications on 
EU Law Live, notably the Insight published on 
the oral hearing and the Op-Ed on AG Hogan’s 
Opinion. Just like the latter Op-Ed, this one will 
be structured around the three main legal 
questions at issue: (i) what should be the legal 
bases used to accede to the Convention; (ii) 
should the signature and concluding decisions be 
split to take into account the variable geometry of 
Ireland’s participation to measures in the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (pursuant to 
Protocol No 21); (iii) and can the Council wait for 
a consensus between Member States on their 
individual accession to an international 
agreement before deciding by qualified majority 
to let the EU accede to that agreement. In 
addition, this Op-Ed will also look into the partial 
inadmissibility of the Parliament’s questions. 
Before turning to these issues, a remarkable and 
very welcome aspect of this Opinion should be 
stressed: in other recent Opinions, the 
observations submitted to the Court are usually 
summarized very briefly. In quantitative terms 
they take up around 10% of the entire Opinion 
(hitting a low of only 3% in Opinion 2/15). In 
Opinion 1/19 however, the summary of the 
observations takes up more than a third of the 
entire Opinion which effectively adds greater 
transparency to the Court’s rulings since 




of the EU institutions and especially those of the 
Member States are pro-actively made public. 
 
Admissibility 
The Court first had to deal with the issue of 
admissibility of the questions since the 
Parliament had asked about the proper legal basis 
to sign and conclude the Istanbul Convention, 
even though the Council had already adopted its 
decision on signature. Was it possible to use the 
Opinion procedure to call into question the 
legality of an act that has already been adopted by 
the Council? This recalls earlier inter-institutional 
allegations of a possible abuse of the more 
flexible Opinion procedure to achieve outcomes 
that can only be secured through an infringement 
action or an action for annulment (see Opinion 
1/13, para. 35 and for a reverse argument Case C-
29/99, para. 52).  In this case it could be argued 
that the Parliament should have brought an action 
for annulment (against the decisions on the 
signature of the Convention). On the latter the 
AG applied Textilwerke Deggendorf (TWD) by 
analogy (para. 40), even if so far,TWD only 
applied to non-privileged parties or to Member 
States that have omitted to challenge decisions 
addressed to them. The Court itself did not pursue 
the TWD route. It extensively recalled its settled 
case law and the purpose and possibilities of the 
Opinion procedure (paras 192-205). 
Subsequently it noted that the preventive purpose 
of the Opinion procedure could not be fulfilled 
anymore in relation to the signature decisions 
(para. 218), further noting that the Parliament had 
indeed been in a position to bring an action for 
annulment against those decisions (para. 219). 
Since this inadmissibility issue did not play for 
the future Council decisions on the conclusion of 
the Convention, the Court was still in a position 
to answer the other questions of the Parliament 




To recall, the Commission had proposed 
to sign and conclude the Istanbul Convention 
based on Articles 82(2) TFEU (judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters) and 84 TFEU 
(supporting measures in crime prevention). In 
its decision on signature, the Council dropped the 
latter provision and instead added Articles 78(2) 
TFEU (asylum) and 83(1) TFEU (definition of 
crimes and sanctions for serious crimes such as 
human trafficking and sexual exploitation). 
Behind this disagreement on legal bases lies a 
disagreement on the extent to which the EU 
should become a party to the Convention and 
(conversely) the extent to which the EU should 
leave a legal space to the Member States to be 
parties in their own right to the Convention. In 
this case, like in most cases where mixed 
agreements, i.e. international agreements 
concluded with third countries whereby both 
Member States and the EU are formal parties on 
the EU side,  are at issue, the Member States in 
Council prefer to restrict the EU participation to 
what is strictly legally necessary. This means that 
the EU would only exercise its exclusive 
competences. 
On this the AG thereby noted that if the Council 
would simply allow the EU to exercise all its 
relevant shared and exclusive competences, the 




TFEU (para. 129). Accepting that the Council can 
elect not to exercise the EU’s shared competences 
(but must of course exercise any exclusive 
competences), he suggested that the legal bases 
should be Articles 78(2), 82(2), 84, and 336 
TFEU. 
The Court settles the legal basis issue by first 
stressing that the correct legal bases will depend 
on the ‘agreement envisaged’ which is not the 
Istanbul Convention as such but only the parts to 
which the EU will commit itself (para. 278), 
following the suggestion of the AG (paras 66-85). 
The problem here of course is that there is a 
(largely political) disagreement on the extent to 
which the EU should become a party to the 
Convention (see above). The Council wants to 
limit the EU’s accession to what is strictly legally 
necessary (‘narrow’ EU accession). The 
Parliament prefers that the EU would exercise its 
competences (regardless of their nature) to the 
fullest extent (‘broad’ EU accession). 
In this respect the Court first suggested that, 
differently from the AG, it would not simply yield 
to the viewpoint of the Council, and noted that it 
would approach the issue in light of the decisions 
on signature (the Council’s position) but also in 
light of the actual question put to it by the 
Parliament (para. 282). It recalled its well-known 
established case law on choice of legal basis 
(paras 284-288) and applied it to the case at hand. 
According to the Court both the context (para. 
289) and the content (para. 290) clearly indicate 
that the ‘envisaged agreement’ is about the 
protection of women against violence, while the 
dual aim is to further the equality between men 
and women and to combat violence against 
women (para. 291). Having looked into these 
objective factors, the Court, just like the AG, 
proceeds by accepting that the assessment must 
also be informed by the subjective preferences of 
the Council. The Court thereby explicitly notes 
that the “limited purpose of the act concluding the 
envisaged agreement is confirmed by the 
substantive legal basis referred to [in 
both] signature decisions” (emphasis added) 
(para. 293) and this even though the Court earlier 
explicitly recalled that a decision on conclusion is 
“in no way a confirmation of the [decision on 
signature]” (para. 201). Clearly this does not 
fully hold true, since the Court accepts that the 
legal bases for signature will pre-determine those 
for conclusion and this because the choice of legal 
basis test is, in reality, not determined by 
objective factors but by the subjective will of the 
Council. 
The Court’s premise thus boils down to the view 
of the Council as expressed in the signature 
decisions, and this premise is not merely a 
(rebuttable) presumption. This is remarkable 
given that the agreement is still only envisaged, 
and the proper approach would be to 
conditionally identify the legal bases subject to 
the caveat that the political preferences of the 
Council and Parliament could still change (just 
like AG Sharpston in Neighbouring 
Rightsconditionally identified the nature of the 
EU ‘s competence in relation to the to be 
negotiated Convention on the protection of the 
rights of broadcasting organisations, see para. 
166) The outcome of the Court’s assessment is 
then the same as that of the AG, finding that that 
the legal bases should be Articles 78(2), 82(2), 84 
and 336 TFEU. The Court thereby held that some 
provisions of the Convention were merely 




e.g. para. 70 & para. 276), the institutional 
provisions of the Istanbul Convention were held 
to be ancillary to the substantive provisions which 
they accompany (para. 309). Similarly, the 
Convention’s provisions dealing with the 
particularly serious crimes that come under 
Article 83(1) TFEU are so limited as to be 
incidental (para. 301). By contrast, even if the 
Convention’s provisions on asylum are 
quantitatively very limited (which since 
the Kazakhstanand Armenia cases is an 
important element to determine the ancillary 
nature of an agreement’s provisions), they form a 
separate chapter of the Convention and impose 
important substantive obligations precluding 
them from being considered incidental and 
requiring the addition of Article 78(2) TFEU 
(para. 304). 
 
Splitting of decisions 
A second issue on which the Parliament queried 
the Court is the Council’s intention to split the 
decision on conclusion to allow Ireland, pursuant 
to Protocol No 21, not to be committed through 
the EU to the Convention’s provisions on asylum 
since Ireland has not opted in to the Directives for 
which an ERTA effect results in exclusive EU 
competence. 
Unlike the AG, the Court does not engage with 
the possible consequences of an ERTA effect 
arising from common rules that come within the 
scope of Protocol No 21. Instead it followed a 
systematic reading of the entire Protocol (para. 
322) and reiterated (as per established case law) 
that the applicability of the Protocol depends on 
the legal basis relied on (para. 325). The Court’s 
reiteration of this principle is also important for 
the pending case asking about the continuance of 
the European Arrest Warrant in relation to the UK 
after Brexit. Since the Withdrawal Agreement 
and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement are not 
based on a provision coming under Title V of Part 
three of the TFEU, Ireland arguably did not need 
to explicitly opt-in to allow for this continuation. 
Since (all but one of) the legal bases identified by 
the Court for the conclusion of the Istanbul 
Convention come under Title V of Part three of 
the TFEU, the Protocol also applies to the 
adoption of the decision on concluding (and 
signing) the Istanbul Convention. However, 
given the Court’s systemic reading of Protocol 
No 21 and the fact that Article 3 of the Protocol 
allows for Irish participation in ‘the proposed 
measure’, the Court adds that splitting decisions 
is in principle impossible and opting in or staying 
out is only possible for the measure as a whole. 
Without saying so explicitly, this suggests that 
the Council’s decisions on signature are invalid 
(para. 328). It should be clear that this solution is 
to be preferred over the one proposed by the AG 
who suggested that splitting should principally be 
allowed (para. 172). Indeed, the Court turns this 
suggestion upside down and only exceptionally 
allows the splitting of decisions. But this only so 
if an objective need requiring such splitting can 
be shown. According to the Court, this would be 
the case when the measure envisaged (here the 
Istanbul Convention) only partially comes under 
the scope of Protocol No 21 or Protocol No 22. 
As the Court notes, such a situation presents itself 
in casu, since the Court found that Article 336 
TFEU (dealing with the EU’s own staff) should 




Splitting the conclusion decision will therefore be 
possible but not in the way the Council envisaged. 
As noted above, the Court did not go into the 
repercussions for the ERTA doctrine. It should be 
recalled here that some common rules (for which 
Ireland used its opt-in under Protocol No 21) are 
affected by the Istanbul Convention, resulting in 
an ERTAeffect and therefore a need for the EU to 
exercise this exclusive competence. The Court’s 
solution suggests however that this ERTA effect 
only applies for the other Member States that are 
bound by the common rules and not for Ireland. 
Instead, for Ireland, the future decision 
concluding the Istanbul Convention would 
amount to an act amending those common rules 
to which Ireland again has the option to opt-in (or 
stay out) under Article 4a of Protocol No 21. 
While this is in no way explicit in Article 4a, that 
Article would thus constitute an empowerment in 
the sense of Article 2(1) TFEU: even if the 
common rules that are binding on Ireland result 
in an ERTA effect and therefore in an exclusive 
EU competence, Article 4a of Protocol No 21 
authorizes Ireland to still exercise a competence 
which has become an EU exclusive competence. 
 
The issue of common accord 
Although the issue of the practice of relying on a 
common accord was the subject of the 
Parliament’s second (and last question), the Court 
found it appropriate to examine it first (without 
explaining why) (para. 229). As one 
commentator (pp. 233-234) put it “[t]he Council 
practice for agreements which do not entirely fall 
within the exclusive competence of the Union […] 
is not to vote in accordance with the majorities 
provided for in Article 218 TFEU, but to apply in 
practice consensus by following a procedure 
which […] consists in ‘verifying’ first whether 
there is ‘common accord’, and only then, once 
there is ‘common accord’, voting in accordance 
with the procedure provided for in the Treaties 
(qualified majority voting, if applicable). In 
practice, the Council considers that Member 
States are to some extent free to decide on the 
practicalities of determining that such ‘consent’ 
or ‘accord’ exists. This way of proceeding of 
‘waiting’ for the ‘common accord’ is often 
presented by the Council as being in accordance 
with the principle of sincere cooperation, as the 
Union should not act before having checked 
whether its Member States have a problem or 
disagree, as the agreement also engages 
competences of the Member States.” 
The Council resorted to this ‘sequenced’ common 
accord approach after the Court prohibited 
in Hybrid acts, the practice whereby the Council 
and the Member States (as sovereign actors under 
international law) jointly adopt a single decision 
to conclude mixed agreements on behalf of the 
EU and its Member States. This was not 
permissible, according to the Court, since it 
confuses the decision-making under the EU 
Treaties with intergovernmental decision-
making. As was envisaged already at the time of 
the Hybrid acts case however, this prohibition 
might merely result in the supranational decision-
making being held hostage by intergovernmental 
blockages, as the ‘common accord’ approach 
illustrates. Could the Council then be forced to 
break free and go ahead despite their not being a 
common accord at the intergovernmental level? 
The Court takes the same vantage point as 




established a new legal order (para. 230), 
whereby the procedures for decision-making are 
not at the disposal of the Member States (or the 
institutions). In this regard, also the principle of 
sincere cooperation cannot be relied upon to alter 
the decision-making procedures prescribed by the 
Treaties (para. 242). In this given case, the Court 
stresses that it is commonly agreed that the 
Istanbul Convention will be a mixed agreement, 
that the Parliament’s consent will be required for 
conclusion and that the Council will have to 
decide by qualified majority (para. 239). The 
Council can therefore not invoke the requirement 
of a common accord between the Member States 
on the conclusion of a mixed agreement as a 
condition before it decides on the conclusion of 
that mixed agreement by the EU, since this would 
alter the decision-making procedure prescribed 
by Article 218 TFEU (para. 245). This important 
statement of principle is of course still relative, 
since it merely means that the Council has to 
avoid referring to a lack of common accord 
among Member States when it is asked to explain 
why it does not conclude a mixed agreement. The 
Court is lucid enough to also recognize this, since 
it notes that the Council still has to muster the 
required majority when concluding an agreement 
(para. 250). In very clear terms the Court goes on 
to state that “both the decision whether or not to 
act on the proposal to conclude an international 
agreement, and, if so, to what extent, and the 
choice of the appropriate time to adopt such a 
decision fall within the Council’s political 
discretion” (para. 252). The prospect of 
identifying useful legal limits that constrain this 
discretion (see e.g. here and here) has therefore 
dimmed considerably. The Council can 
legitimately decide to continue discussions in 
order to build a bigger consensus between the 
Member States (paras 253-254). At the same time 
the Court points out that a vote may be ‘forced’, 
since according to Article 11 of the 
Council’s Rules of Procedure, the Council 
Presidency must hold a vote on an issue if one 
Member State  or the Commission so requests 
and a majority of the Member States agree to 
holding a vote (para. 255). 
Having confirmed the Council’s political 
discretion, the Court also rejects the arguments by 
some of the Member States, and even the Council 
itself, suggesting that pushing ahead with the 
conclusion in absence of a common accord would 
be illegal under EU law or result in the liability of 
the EU under international law. Indeed, when the 
EU would accede without all its Member States, 
the EU cannot exercises the competences of those 
Member States (para. 264). As noted by Kübek in 
an earlier Analysis of the Opinion on EU Law 
Live, the Court’s reason why under international 
law, the EU’s liability would not arise is far from 
convincing. 
A further puzzling part of the Court’s Opinion on 
this point (and also on the issue of the legal basis) 
is how it engages with its own statement in 
the AMP Antarctique case that the EU needs to 
exercise its powers ‘in observance of 
international law’. The Commission relied on this 
to argue that the EU should go for a ‘broad 
accession’ (see above) in order not to frustrate the 
objectives of the Istanbul Convention (para. 283), 
whereas the Council relied on it to argue in favour 
of waiting for a common accord, since without all 
the Member States being parties to the 
Convention the EU would not be able to ensure a 
proper implementation of the provisions to which 




dismissed both sets of arguments (paras 272 and 
283) by noting that the purpose of the Opinion 
procedure is to assess the compatibility an 
international agreement with EU law, not the 
other way around. Evidently, the Opinion 
procedure should not be used to assess 
hypothetical future (in)action of the EU that could 
lead to its liability under international law but 
when that future (in)action is pre-ordained by the 
way in which the EU accedes to an agreement it 
would run counter to the telos of the Opinion 
procedure were the Court not to look into the 
issue. In addition, the Court seems to view the 
requirement to respect international law as an 
external obligation imposed on the EU by 
international law, disregarding Article 3(5) TEU 
which makes clear that the strict observance of 
international law is an obligation that is 
internalized in the EU’s own constitutional 
charter. 
Specifically how the Court dismissed the 
Council’s reliance on AMP 
Antarctique highlights the confused logic 
inherent in AMP Antarctique. To recall, in that 
ruling the Court held that international law may 
prevent the EU to exercise 
its shared competences on its own and instead 
require it to act jointly with the Member States. 
Arguably, that logic only applies to the EU’s 
shared competences and depends on the specific 
legal framework in international law. It is 
remarkable then that while the Court in Opinion 
1/19 starts from the premise that the EU will 
limits itself to exercising its exclusive 
competences when acceding to the Istanbul 
Convention (see above), it does not at the outset 
reject the Council’s AMP Antarctique argument 
on the basis that the AMP Antarctique doctrine 
arguably only applies to the EU’s shared 
competences. 
 
A way forward 
The Parliament returns rather empty handed from 
its trip to Luxembourg. The Court confirms that 
the extent to which the EU accedes to the 
Convention is decided by the Council (which the 
Parliament can of course reject, but then the EU 
does not accede at all). While incomplete mixity 
may be a sign of the absurdity of mixity, the 
Court accepts the possibility of the EU 
concluding a mixed agreement to which not all its 
Member States are parties. The Court even 
identifies a way forward (a simple majority of 
Member States forcing a vote in the Council) but 
this still requires a qualified majority of Member 
States to disregard diplomatic conventions within 
the Council. Will recent initiatives in a number of 
Eastern Member States create the momentum to 
do so? In 2018, the Bulgarian Constitutional 
Court held that the Convention goes against the 
Bulgarian Constitution. In 2019, the Slovak 
Parliament called on the Government to 
terminate the ratification procedure. In 2020 
the Hungarian Parliament did the same. And in 
2021 a proposal was put forward in the Polish 
Parliament to make Poland withdraw from the 
Convention. The (other) Member States that have 
ratified the Istanbul Convention muster the 
necessary qualified majority to proceed and allow 
the EU to accede to the Convention as well and if 
the Commission alters its proposal, they could opt 
to go for the broadest possible accession of the 
EU to the Istanbul Convention. As noted by the 
AG, this would result in Articles 3(3) TEU and 19 




TFEU, this would bind all Member States, 
including the recalcitrant ones. 
 
 
Merijn Chamon is Assistant Professor of EU 
Law at Maastricht University, Visiting Professor 
at the College of Europe (Bruges) and voluntary 
collaborator at the Ghent European Law 
Institute. I would like to thank Graham Butler, 
Thomas Verellen, Bruno de Witte and Gesa 
Kübek for their comments on an earlier draft. All 













































All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a 
retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, 
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written 
permission of the publishers. 
 
Permission to use this content must be obtained from the copyright owner. 
 
EU Law Live is an online publication, focused on European Union law and legal 
developments related to the process of European integration. It publishes News on a 






Anjum Shabbir and Dolores Utrilla 
 
Editorial Board 
Maja Brkan, Marco Lamandini, Adolfo Martín, Jorge Piernas, Ana Ramalho, René 
Repasi, Anne-Lise Sibony, Araceli Turmo, Isabelle Van Damme and Maria Weimer. 
 
ISSN  
EU Law Live   2695-9585 
EU Law Live Weekend Edition 2695-9593 
 
 
 
 
 
